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The latest war of words between Tbilisi and Moscow over Georgia’s bilateral military 
agreement with the US reflects tensions that have been building between Russia and its 
southern neighbors. Simply stated, Russia is reasserting imperial ambitions vis-à-vis 
former Soviet states.
NATO provides a current example of security agreements between states with (at least 
temporarily) common objectives. Thus, the Werhofstadt plan, named after the Belgian 
prime minister, constitutes a collective attempt by Germany, France, Belgium and 
Luxembourg to create a separate entity within NATO. In the wake of September 11, and 
on the eve of the conflict with Saddam Hussein, the US entered into a number of 
mutually beneficial security arrangements with Caucasian and Central Asian states.
On the other hand, it is difficult to discern common objectives between Russia and 
certain other post-Soviet republics. Coercion and blackmail appear to overshadow any 
communality. In order to understand fully Russia’s overreaction to Georgia’s bilateral 
agreement with the US, it is important to reflect on Moscow’s current relationships with 
the other states south of Russia. Such analysis reveals a pattern of Russian behavior 
that reflects its real aspirations in the region. That pattern includes a continued Russian 
military presence in these countries, frequently without their consent, as well as other 
means of imposing Moscow’s will.
Thus, in Georgia, Russia has approximately 8,000 soldiers (as compared to the 80 US 
special forces officers training Georgian troops). These are located in three Russian 
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"garrisons" (Moscow has prevaricated over withdrawal for years) as well as Russian 
"peacekeepers" between Georgia proper and its secessionist province of Abkhazia who 
prevent the return of 250,000 ethnic Georgian refugees to Abkhazia.
Moscow is keeping a keen eye on all of the Caucasus. Last month, the Russian State 
Duma approved a statement condemning as "an exceptionally unfriendly and even 
hostile act" the bilateral Georgian-US agreement on military cooperation that the 
Georgian parliament had ratified. (1) Members of the Duma objected especially vocally 
to the (hypothetical) possibility that Georgia might grant the US military the right to cross 
into Georgia’s secessionist South Ossetian and Abkhaz republics, claiming that Russian 
servicemen stationed in Georgian "garrisons" are unable to do so.
The Russian Duma decries as "an unfriendly act" the deployment of "a US military 
contingent, hardware and armaments in the vicinity of the Russian state border.... This 
may lead to an exacerbation of the situation with regard to the Russian military bases in 
Georgia."(2) Duma CIS Affairs Committee Chairman Andrei Kokoshin added that "the 
Georgian-US agreement creates an uneven playing field for Russia by granting 
privileges to US servicemen in Georgia that do not also extend to Russian military 
personnel. The Georgian move will hinder joint antiterrorism efforts in the region."(3) 
(Again, the reference is to 80 US officers as compared to 8,000 Russian troops.)
In fact, the agreement simply states that US military personnel is allowed visa-free entry  
and exit from Georgia, is permitted to carry weapons, and is immune from prosecution 
in Georgian courts. The agreement also allows the US armed forces to deploy hardware 
on Georgian territory without impediments. It merely puts into writing the rules under 
which 80 US special forces officers train Georgian troops in counter-terrorist operations, 
an activity that has been continuing for over 12 months. (4)
In Tbilisi’s response to Moscow, Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli Menagharishvili 
pointed out that "other NATO members have signed analogous agreements with several 
CIS member states. The Duma’s harsh reaction will reflect adversely on Russia’s 
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international image."(5) Georgia’s ambassador to Russia, Zurab Abashidze, added, 
"Russian servicemen, whose number in Georgia amounts to 8,000, could enjoy the 
same privileges if Russia did not introduce a [travel-impeding] visa regime on its own 
initiative. There is nothing secret in Georgia. We propose to create a Washington-
Moscow-Tbilisi triangle to solve the problem of fighting against terrorism in southern 
Caucasus by joint efforts." (6)
As justification for Moscow’s overreaction, Alexander Shabanov, chairman of the 
Russian parliament’s committee on geopolitical affairs, claimed that "the US Georgian 
pact confirms Washington’s desire to expand its global reach. This agreement seriously 
upsets the balance of forces in the [Caucasus] region and poses a threat to international 
security." (7) The implication is that Moscow reserves for itself dominant influence in the 
region.
Expressions of concern that US troops might cross the borders into Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia betray an assumption that these provinces somehow constitute a part of 
Russia. In effect, Russia is using the bilateral agreement as a pretext to justify keeping 
its troops in Georgia. This may have been Moscow’s intent all along. During current 
negotiations, Russia claims it will take 11 years to withdraw troops from Georgia, 
whereas Tbilisi has offered Moscow a full 4 years to accomplish this task. (8)
Courting both sides
Azerbaijan is another important Caucasian republic because of its position on the 
western edge of the Caspian. Its ailing president, Heydar Aliev, has long disappointed 
Moscow, by courting Moscow’s viceroy there. Russia clearly expected to gain more 
influence over Azerbaijan in return for allowing Aliev to gain power. Speculation abounds 
as to what Aliev will do to secure his chosen successor; concessions to Russia, in return 
for political and perhaps military support from Moscow, are not beyond the bounds of 
credibility. While the 10-year Russian lease on the Gabala radar station allows Moscow 
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to have some units in the country, any situation providing Russia with an alibi for moving 
additional troops into Azerbaijan is likely to be exploited. (9)
Indeed, visits to Baku by Russian Federation Security Council Secretary Vladimir 
Rushailo and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov sparked rumors that such an alibi had 
been provided. The officials signed intergovernmental agreements on military and 
technical cooperation, leading at least one Azeri newspaper to conclude that "during the 
visits they discussed the creation of the second military facility in Azerbaijan. Such 
agreements might result in Russia deploying new military units in our country in the 
future, or Azerbaijan allowing Russia to deploy its troops ... in exchange for military 
assistance and staff training." (10)
However, Aliev has not been quick to agree to anything that would cement an 
orientation toward Russia. Meeting with the chairman of the US Senate’s NATO 
committee in mid-April, the Azeri president explained that, since joining NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace Program in 1994, Azerbaijan has "been quietly doing everything 
to facilitate the process" of obtaining an invitation to join the Western alliance. (11)
In the meantime, Azerbaijan continues to watch closely events in Armenia. The recent 
deployment of Russian troops (withdrawn from one of the "garrisons" in Georgia) to the 
102nd military base in Gyumri, in northwest Armenia, (12) was not met with enthusiasm 
in Baku.
Economic & military pressure
Of the other republics to Russia’s south, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia seem 
unable to withstand Russian pressure. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have unstable 
governments and fragile economies. In the last few months, Moscow has increased its 
military presence in these two countries to over 19,000 troops, 12 fighter aircraft and 13 
transport and training aircraft. (13) Russia uses the Collective Security Treaty’s (CSTO) 
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Central Asian sector, comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as a 
justification for increasing its troops and security forces in these countries.
Armenia falls in the same category. It needs Moscow’s assistance to continue its 
occupation of Azerbaijani territory, leaving it little choice but to fall in with Russia 
demands. (14) There is also a high level of economic dependence. Last year, to wipe 
out a $100 million debt, Yerevan offered to hand over Armenian industrial assets to 
cover the amount owed. The acquisitions — including a power station, an electronics 
plant and three high-tech factories — join a large number of Armenian assets already 
held by the Russian Federation. The ramifications will not be simply economic. As 
Vladimir Socor of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in 
Washington, DC, pointed out, "Armenia has become the first case study in Russia’s 
strategy to regain political dominance over post-Soviet countries by taking over their 
economic infrastructure." (15)
Nationalism versus imperialism
Kazakhstan is less vulnerable. Kazakhstan has rich reserves of oil spread across its 
territory. There is a definite sense of national identity. Moscow has conducted numerous 
military exercises and exchange programs with Astana in hope of establishing a 
permanent military presence within Kazakhstan’s borders. The Kazakh government is in 
the process of moving its capital (for the second time in less than 10 years) to the 
nearby city of Agmola, maintaining its presence in the northern region where a large 
Slav population previously threatened the Kazakh foothold. Moreover, Kazakhstan has 
engaged in a degree of flirtation with the West, to Moscow’s evident displeasure. 
Geographically, Kazakhstan blocks Russia’s access to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
However, Moscow has been successful at establishing some influence over 
Kazakhstan. One example is the recent joint military command structure established by 
Russia, and including Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which 
gives military teeth to the Collective Security Treaty Organization set up in 1992. (16)
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Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have continued to stand up to Russian pressure. The 
Uzbeks have a strong sense of historical continuity from the glory days of Bukhara and 
Samarkand and the Turkmen are fiercely independent. Both countries have cooperated 
with the West, especially in the fight against drug and weapons traffic. Uzbek officials 
recently worked with Western agencies and interdicted several shipments of material 
related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) transiting their border. (17)
Still, as Vladimir Lukin, the deputy speaker of the State Duma, explained, Russia has 
not lost its influence in Central Asia. Noting a recently signed long-term agreement with 
Turkmenistan concerning gas transport, Lukin said "you can see that the interests of 
Russia are respected here. And they are respected in Tajikistan. And I think that 
gradually they will become respected in Uzbekistan, gradually, but to a lesser 
extent."(18)
Begun in 1991, the CSTO differs substantially from most other collective security 
arrangements. Ever since President Vladimir Putin took power three years ago, Moscow 
has pressed for an ongoing Russian military presence in most of the other treaty 
members. It is little wonder that Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan pulled out of the 
treaty, seeking instead a more Western orientation. (19) Border troops in former Soviet 
states constitute an important factor in Moscow’s political-military calculus.
Georgia constitutes a particular battleground between territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, on the one hand, and a continued Russian military presence (and support 
for secessionist border republics), on the other hand. Such persistent flouting of 
international law and custom has become increasingly rare in the post-1945 world. 
Especially grave is the fact that the host country has no control whatever over Russian 
troops on its soil. This pattern would be less ominous, were Moscow prepared to accept 
some degree of mutuality and consultation with the host countries. Particularly in the 
case of Georgia, this element is conspicuous by its absence.
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The West has a distinct interest in helping these post-communist states to assert their 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, an essential base if they are to establish more 
democratic political systems and market-based economies. (This is the case especially 
in Central Asia, where porous borders and weak law enforcement have created 
significant opportunities for terrorism and for traffic in illicit weapons and drugs.)
The effect of such interest should not be underestimated. It is noteworthy that Russia’s 
bullying of the Baltic states, which differed only in degree but not in kind from its actions 
toward Central Asian and Caucasian countries, diminished significantly once Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania were accepted into NATO. 
1 Kommersant, 21 April 2003; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database.
2 RFE/RL Newsline, 17 April 2003.
3 ITAR-TASS, 0749 GMT, 16 April 2003; FBIS-SOV-2003-0416, via World News 
Connection.
4 RFE/RL Newsline, 16 April 2003.
5 AP, 21 March 2003; via Lexis-Nexis.
6 Ekho Moskvy, 17 April 2003; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
7Transitions On-Line, 23 April 2003; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database.
8 Ibid.
9 Federal News Service, 2 April 2003; via Lexis-Nexis.
7
10 Hurriyyat, 4 March 2003; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis.
11 Kommersant, 21 April 2003; What the Papers Say, via Lexis-Nexis.
12 Prime-News, 1030 GMT, 11 April 2003; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis.
13 Interfax, 1219 GMT, 2 December 2002; via Lexis-Nexis, and Agence France-Presse, 
27 April 2003; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database.
14 Ibid.
15 The Baltic Times, 3 April 2003; Global News Wire, via Lexis-Nexis.
16 Agence France-Presse, 28 April 2003; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database.
17 RFE/RL Newsline, 17 April 2003.
18 Federal News Service, 16 April 2003; via Lexis-Nexis.
19 Analyst, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 14 September 2000.
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2002
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal have been commissioned especially for 
Perspective. This article was originally published at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol13/Kwast.html.
8
